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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has been a resurgence of left-wing terrorism in 
the northeastern United States. Issue-oriented groups, dormant since the 
end of the Vietnam War, have reemerged to champion new causes, and 
new groups have formed. These new groups have claimed responsibility 
for sixteen bombings in the New York and Washington, D.C., 
metropolitan areas during the past four years. In New York, multina-
tional corporations, military facilities, and government offices have been 
the primary targets. Attacks have been carried out against branch offices 
of IBM, Honeywell, Motorola, Union Carbide, and General Electric, as 
well as the local FBI office, a Navy recruiting station, a Naval Reserve 
Center, and a National Guard armory. In Washington, D.C., the Senate 
wing of the U.S. Capitol was bombed, as were the Navy yard and a Navy 
recruiting station. 
Although the exact composition of the new groups is not known, 
law enforcement personnel believe that all of these organizations are in 
some way related to the Black Liberation Army (BLA). They base this 
conclusion on several facts: 
1) the wording of communiques issued by the new groups is extraor-
dinarily similar to that used by the BLA; 
2) identical types of weapons are employed by the groups; and 
3) the new groups and the BLA generally select targets of similar sym-
bolic significance.1 
The major indigenous left-wing terrorist groups are shown in Fig. 1. 
The leftist terrorists can generally be described as "uniformly anti-
U.S., anti-imperialist organizations that believe that the root causes of 
the world's ills lie in America's exploitation of non-White Third World 
peoples."2 Their targets — banks, corporate offices, and military 
facilities — are chosen to publicize the terrorists' cause and existence, as 
well as to symbolize their anti-imperialist/anti-capitalist ideology. 
Operations are staged to generate what the terrorists refer to as "armed 
propaganda."3 The rationale behind this use of terrorism is explained by 
Thomas Manning, a member of the United Freedom Front: 
A few years back, somebody bombed the South African 
airlines office. Not long after, somebody bombed a 
South African building. That draws a lot of attention to 
those kinds of places. It wasn't long after that that peo-
ple started demonstrating in front of the South African 
embassy — now that's popular." 
Other types of operations, designed to acquire operational funds, include 
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trafficking.5 Bank robbing appears to be the leftists' principal, and most 
lucrative, source of income.6 
THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED TASK FORCE 
The abortive holdup of a Brinks armored truck in Nyack, Rockland 
County, New York, in October 1981 furnished the first evidence of the 
cooperative bonds that had been forged between white radicals and black 
extremists.7 Until that time, police and federal authorities had assumed 
that the variety of small, radical leftist groups that had periodically sur-
faced since the end of the Vietnam era were wholly separate and distinct, 
with no connection to other terrorist organizations in this country. The 
Brinks robbery, however, brought to light evidence that two of 
America's most notorious revolutionary groups, the largely white 
Weather Underground and the exclusively black BLA, had formed an 
alliance known as the Revolutionary Armed Task Force (RATF).8 
Although the exact date of this merger is unclear, it is believed that the 
two groups established formal relations sometime after BLA leader 
Joanne Chesimard's escape from a New Jersey prison in 1979.9 
The RATF was responsible for the Brinks robbery, and police raids 
on safehouses used by the robbers uncovered documents that revealed 
the merger of the Weather Underground and the BLA. In itself, the 
merger was unprecedented. During the era of the Vietnam War, white 
leftist radicals and black militants with similar ideological orientations 
were unable to establish cooperation. Despite the radicals' efforts, their 
black counterparts tended to resent the whites' affluent suburban 
backgrounds and disparaged them for exhibiting "revolutionary preten-
sions" and for lacking a true commitment to achieving political change 
by whatever methods, specifically, violent methods, were necessary.10 
The inability to conclude an agreement eventually spawned a series 
of internal disputes within the Weather Underground which finally com-
pelled one faction to break away from the aboveground support ap-
paratus, known as the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee, in 1975 and 
form a new group called the May 19th Coalition (sometimes referred to 
as the May 19th Communist Organization)." 
The May 19th Coalition perceived its mission as the development 
and strengthening of links between politically militant blacks and 
Hispanics and their white ideological counterparts. It has largely become 
the aboveground political support apparatus of the RATF and the BLA. 
Its spokesperson, Judith A. Clark, participated in the Brinks robbery 
and is presently serving a sentence in New York's Woodbourne peniten-
tiary. Clark is also alleged to have represented the May 19th Coalition at 
a conference sponsored by the PLO in Beirut, Lebanon, a month before 
the bank robbery.12 
The May 19th Coalition actively pursues its aims in America's 
prisons, recruiting black criminals in the prisons and recently paroled 
convicts. The Coalition typically establishes contact by offering black in-
mates free legal services and counseling. The prisoners who accept this 
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offer are gradually drawn into "consciousness raising" meetings and 
seminars run by other inmates, where they receive rudimentary political 
indoctrination into the terrorists' ideological beliefs. Those who start to 
recognize their "victimization" by a "racist" and "unjust" society are 
earmarked for recruitment into the RATF or BLA upon their release.13 
The May 19th cadres also function as couriers for the RATF and 
BLA, running a tight clandestine communications network among the 
imprisoned terrorists and their peers on the outside. This has enabled the 
BLA to maintain cohesion. The RATF network appears to extend across 
the United States. Ties have been established with the Mississippi chapter 
of the Republic of New Afrika groups (a militant black organization that 
advocates armed struggle to establish an independent black country in 
the American south14) and with the Wells Spring Commune (a group of 
paroled black prisoners operating in the San Francisco area). A van used 
in the Brinks robbery was traced to the Republic of New Afrika group, 
while an RATF member who participated in the robbery reportedly was a 
guest of the Wells Spring Commune during a visit to San Francisco. 
These groups share arms and intelligence, provide safehouses, and assist 
in the planning and execution of operations, including prison escapes. 
William Morales, an FALN bomber, was aided in his escape from prison 
in 1979 by the BLA and the May 19th Coalition. However, although the 
RATF supports the creation of an independent Puerto Rico, no formal 
cooperation between the Puerto Rican terrorists and the RATF has been 
detected beyond that of fraternal political support.15 
There are believed to be fewer than 50 active RATF members.16 
However, the group is highly disciplined and its limited membership 
makes it virtually impossible to infiltrate. Evidence uncovered in connec-
tion with the Brinks holdup reflected the security precautions, organiza-
tional skill, logistical support, and operational expertise of the group. 
In 1976, several small cells, each of which contained black, 
Hispanic, and white members, were established throughout the country. 
The New York cell, which participated in the Brinks' robbery, was head-
ed largely by blacks but was supported by a "secondary team" of 
politically radical white women. The women transported messages 
among safehouses and cells, surreptitiously surveyed possible targets, 
and did odd jobs such as renting cars and apartments and buying 
weapons. The black members of the cell apparently carried out the ter-
rorist operations themselves, although the women sometimes drove the 
getaway cars. Respectably dressed and looking like housewives or com-
muters, the women were an essential component of the cell's escape plans 
and operations.17 
The New York cell is thought to have accumulated an estimated $1 
million from bank robberies between 1976 and 1981. The money was us-
ed for safehouses, food, and other living expenses, as well as weapons 
and drugs; $100,000 was used to lease a three-story building in Harlem 
that ostensibly served as an acupuncture clinic but in fact concealed an 
arms warehouse and a narcotics distribution center.18 
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When police raided a network of RATF safehouses in New York, 
they discovered detailed documents on several private companies and 
multinational corporations that were doing business with South Africa. 
It appears that the group was planning a terrorist campaign against 
American businesses involved in such dealings. 
Apartheid in South Africa has long been an important issue among 
black militants and white activists in the United States, one that provides 
a common cause cementing the sometimes tenuous bonds that unite 
them. A few weeks before the Brinks robbery, a May 19th Coalition 
member had organized a violent demonstration at New York's JFK Air-
port to protest the arrival in the United States of the South African rugby 
team. During the team's nationwide tour, bombs exploded at the 
American Rugby Union offices in upstate New York and in Indiana. In 
December 1981, simultaneous bombings hit the South African Airways 
freight offices at JFK and an IBM office in Harrison, New York. The 
bombings were claimed by the hitherto unknown United Freedom 
Fighters, a name that may have been just a cover for RATF operations 
against or concerning South Africa. IBM was claimed to have been 
bombed because of its extensive investments in that country." 
Exactly a month later, a bomb exploded at the FBI office in New 
York. This attack was claimed by the Revolutionary Fighting Group, 
probably another pseudonym used by the RATF.20 Terrorist groups 
often use different names in claiming responsibility for attacks, both to 
give an exaggerated impression of strength and numbers and to inhibit 
federal authorities from bringing charges against the terrorists. Under 
current laws, individuals linked to one group cannot be indicted for a 
bombing committed by another group unless they can be directly tied to 
that group — and this is not possible if the group exists only on paper. 
On May 11, 1985, federal authorities arrested Marilyn Jean Buck, 
one of the Brinks robbery suspects who had been still at large. A search 
of Buck's apartment in Baltimore and other safehouses in Pennsylvania, 
New York, and Connecticut uncovered explosives, timers, weapons, 
cash, and false identity papers, and stolen vehicles were found in nearby 
garages. In addition, according to the FBI, "very detailed" plans to 
bomb at least a dozen federal offices in Washington — including the Old 
Executive Office Building where Vice-President Bush's office is located 
and a building at the U.S. Naval Academy — were found in a file drawer 
marked "in progress." The evidence linked Buck and two accomplices to 
sixteen bombings that had occurred in New York and Washington since 
1982, including the bombing of the U.S. Capitol.21 
UNITED FREEDOM FRONT 
The United Freedom Front (UFF), a group apparently formed to 
protest U.S. involvement in Central America (not to be confused with 
the United Freedom Fighters), first came to public attention on May 12, 
1983, when it claimed responsibility for bombing an Army Reserve 
Center in Uniondale, New York. The following night, the group struck 
again, bombing the Naval Reserve Center in Queens. Two more 
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bombings of military facilities were carried out in 1983, one against a Na-
tional Guard Armory in the Bronx and the other at a Navy Recruiting 
Center in East Meadow. In December 1983, the group claimed respon-
sibility for two bombs that exploded in front of the Honeywell offices in 
Queens. A caller stated that the Honeywell bombs were set off to protest 
U.S. policy in Central America. 
On January 12, 1984, a spokesperson for the UFF called UPI and 
directed federal agents to a mailbox in Brooklyn, which contained a com-
muniqué that explained the group's mission to "protest U.S. imperialism 
around the world" and promised future bombings.22 The Pentagon later 
warned 22 top defense contractors about the possibility of bombing at-
tacks by terrorist groups.23 On March 19, 1984, the UFF exploded its 
tenth bomb in the New York metropolitan area, this one at an IBM 
facility in the town of Purchase. This was the third attack by the group 
against IBM. Literature was left at the site of the blast, decrying the rela-
tionship between the United States and South Africa. The most recent 
operation claimed by the group took place on September 27, 1984, when 
the offices of Union Carbide in Tarrytown, New York, were bombed. 
An FBI agent explained that the group was attacking, "what they 
perceived as the injustice of imperialism around the world and specifical-
ly Union Carbide for business dealings in South Africa."24 Less than 24 
hours earlier, a group calling itself Guerrilla Resistance took credit for a 
bomb that wrecked part of the South African consulate in New York 
City. 
On March 13, 1985, seven members of the UFF were indicted on 
charges of bombing a total of ten businesses and military installations in 
the New York area. Five of the defendants had been arrested in Ohio in 
November 1984, including Raymond Luc Levasseur, a member of the 
Sam Melville-Jonathan Jackson Unit,25 who was wanted for the 1981 
murder of a New Jersey state trooper. The Sam Melville-Jonathan 
Jackson Unit and the United Freedom Front are now believed to have 
been the same group. 
THE ARMED RESISTANCE UNIT 
On November 6, 1983, the Armed Resistance Unit (ARU) claimed 
credit for the bomb that exploded in the Senate wing of the U.S. Capitol. 
An anonymous telephone caller explained that the blast was in retaliation 
for the U.S. invasion of Grenada a few days earlier and for the American 
presence in Lebanon. Investigations of the bombing and of two other 
Washington-area attacks against U.S. Navy targets, also claimed by the 
ARU, established a number of similarities between those operations and 
the bombings perpetrated by the UFF.26 An FBI spokesman stated, 
"There is a possibility that the ARU and the UFF are one and the same. 
The communiqués issued by the ARU had language very similar to the 
communiqués issued by the UFF. Furthermore, there is consistency in 
their target selection and bomb construction."27 
Speaking at a press conference shortly after the Capitol bombing, 
FBI Director William Webster said that the bomb detonated at the 
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Capitol had a dual firing mechanism similar to the devices used in ten or 
eleven other bombings during the previous two years. However, he con-
ceded that the FBI had no basis for concluding that all of the bombings 
came from "the same source." Webster noted that calls from people 
claiming responsibility for the bombing contained "the same type of 
words we experienced with the older dissident groups that have become 
dormant and which in a way have metamorphosed through other 
organizations we've been watching closely in light of the Nyack [Brinks] 
robbery." He emphasized that "the inferences we are drawing result not 
only from the rhetoric of claims but also the nature of the explosives 
which were used in all of these cases and the manner in which they were 
put together".28 
In any event, the UFF bombings motivated many corporations to 
bolster security. The Grumman Corporation, for example, built a three-
foot-high concrete wall around its Bethpage, Long Island, plants to pro-
tect against truck or car bombs similar to those used in the Middle East. 
Moreover, federal bomb experts have been warning suburban police 
forces around the New York metropolitan area that they may be the next 
targets of terrorists. As Arostegui notes: 
At a time when security has been tightened around cor-
porate and governmental facilities located in inner city 
areas, the suburbs have also come to offer softer targets 
for terrorists. During the past ten years many large cor-
porations have moved their headquarters and main of-
fices to suburban areas for the purpose of minimizing the 
risk of terrorist or criminal harassment. Corporate 
security directors admit that such facilities in the suburbs 
generally [have] less security than those in the inner city.29 
CONCLUSION: 
FUTURE PROSPECTS OF LEFT-WING TERRORISM 
Left-wing terrorist organizations have operated in the United States 
for nearly 20 years. The new leftist groups that have emerged in recent 
years have embraced controversial, popular causes such as U.S. involve-
ment in Central America and South Africa's apartheid policy in an at-
tempt to broaden their base of support. Because nuclear disarmament is 
one of the most emotional and controversial domestic issues, it is not in-
conceivable that these groups might turn their attention to nuclear 
facilities and weapons. 
However, no attempt has ever been mounted against any target as 
well-defended as a nuclear weapons facility. Left-wing terrorist opera-
tions have been confined to bombings of symbolic targets and armed 
robbery. Bombings ("armed propaganda") are calculated to appeal to 
the terrorists' perceived constituency, the leftward-leaning, politically 
concerned, nonviolent activists. Almost all the bombings occur at night 
and in public areas; they are planned to avoid inflicting casualties or 
widespread destruction; they are announced ahead of time, to allow the 
evacuation of the target site. 
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This is not intended to imply that U.S. left-wing terrorists may not 
attack defended targets in the future. Clearly, few terrorist acts would be 
more symbolic than an attack on a nuclear weapons facility or the 
detonation of a small nuclear explosive. However, on the basis of past 
modus operandi, targeting patterns, and the general mindset of par-
ticular terrorist organizations, leftist terrorists seem unlikely to drastical-
ly alter their strategy or tactics. 
Admittedly, as noted above, there is evidence that at least one left-
wing group, the Sam Melville-Jonathan Jackson Unit, has entertained 
the idea of bombing a Department of Energy nuclear weapons research 
laboratory. And the June 1983 Prairie Fire Organizing Committee 
book30 of communiqués issued over the years by the Red Army Faction 
(RAF) in West Germany, War on the Warmakers, stated: 
We believe that the experience of the movement against 
imperialist war in West Germany is of great importance 
to all people who want to build an effective struggle 
against imperialism inside the U.S. As war grows, the 
limitations of the mainstream leadership of the anti-
nuke, anti-war organizations are becoming obvious.... 
We support the people in the anti-nuclear movement 
who are taking up solidarity with El Salvador and are 
beginning to address the broader issue of U.S. 
Militarism. This process needs to be advanced and the 
movement must become more militant.31 
However, the terrorists' attempt to link their goals and raison d'etre 
to broader political issues is less a direct threat to the security of U.S. 
nuclear weapons facilities than a public relations gambit. Of course, ter-
rorist operations could escalate to include nuclear targets, but this seems 
unlikely, since an assault on a nuclear site is inconsistent with the basic 
beliefs of most left-wing terrorists. One disquieting possibility, however, 
is that of some foreign power enlisting indigenous left-wing terrorists to 
carry out an operation against a nuclear weapons facility. 
Because many members of militant black and radical white 
organizations have been arrested during the past two years, the level of 
terrorism carried out by leftist groups may in fact have peaked. Only one 
recent act of violent terrorism has been linked to the left: the bombing of 
the Police Benevolent Association in New York City on February 23, 
1985. The attack was claimed by the Red Guerrilla Defense, which had 
taken responsibility for the April 1984 bombing of the Israeli Aircraft In-
dustries offices in New York and an explosion five months later at the 
South African consulate in New York.32 
The RATF was effectively neutralized following the abortive holdup 
of an armored car in 1981 and has suffered further setbacks since then as 
the group's remaining members have been rounded up by police. Accor-
dingly, it does not pose a credible threat to nuclear weapons facilities. 
Although the RATF is skilled in clandestine tradecraft, the use of 
disguises, and the use of firearms and explosives, its operational capacity 
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is severely limited. The group has never attempted to attack a well-
defended target, and although members have been involved in shootouts 
with police, they have generally tried to avoid armed confrontation. 
Left-wing terrorist groups in the United States have long found it 
difficult to recruit succeeding generations of terrorists. They have had to 
rely on the same "hard core" of individuals, many of whom went 
underground more than a decade ago. Accordingly, unless these groups 
are able to reverse their dependence on the old guard and recruit a new 
generation of members, it appears that they will continue to lose strength 
and momentum, as the few remaining terrorists on the outside become 
increasingly preoccupied with avoiding arrest rather than with staging 
new operations. 
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